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I. INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment of the Constitution grants broad protection
of free speech and expression for citizens of the United States.1 This
right, when exercised by a citizen, is subject only to a handful of ar-
ticulated limitations based on the content of the speech.2 However,
this quintessential right is altered and subject to greater limitation
when the speech at issue has not been delivered by an individual act-
ing in his or her capacity as a citizen, but as a student.3 The altered
First Amendment standard for student speech seeks to provide school
administrators4 and teachers with the means to maintain control of
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. See Matthew Broderick, Supreme Court Avoids Crushing the First Amendment:
Why the Decision in United States v. Stevens Was Important for the Preservation
of First Amendment Rights, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 577 (2011) (listing the categories
of speech that are not protected by the First Amendment).
3. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (“First Amendment
rights of students in the public schools ‘are not automatically coextensive with
the rights of adults in other settings.’”) (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fra-
ser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)); see also Scott Dranoff, Tinker-ing with Speech Cat-
egories: Solving the Off-Campus Student Speech Problem with a Categorical
Approach and a Comprehensive Framework, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 649, 655–57
(2013) (noting the Supreme Court’s willingness, in certain circumstances, to per-
mit regulation of student speech based on the content of said speech).
4. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683 (“The determination of what manner of speech in the
classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school
board.”).
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the school environment.5 Schools exercise said control through the
regulation of student speech that would be protected by the First
Amendment in other contexts.6 While students clearly do not enjoy
the same First Amendment protections as typical citizens,7 the issue
is rife with uncertainty and has prompted significant debate in the
legal community.
The debate and conflict surrounding this issue arises from speech
that takes place outside of the physical territory of the school (off-cam-
pus speech).8 What is the limit of this minimized First Amendment
protection? When do students take off their student hats and don their
citizen hats, entitling them to the full protection of the First Amend-
ment? These questions have proven vexing for both legal scholars and
federal judges. Federal appellate courts have attempted to craft stan-
dards for determining under what circumstances school officials have
the authority to discipline students for speech that originates off-cam-
pus.9 This Note aims to articulate a workable threshold test for deter-
mining whether an individual’s off-campus speech falls under the
regulatory umbrella of school officials and the diminished protection
of the First Amendment.
Part I draws attention to the distinction between First Amendment
protection afforded to the average citizen and the lessened protection
afforded to citizens acting in their capacity as students. Additionally,
Part I acknowledges the difficulty in assessing whether an individual
is acting as a citizen or a student. Part II examines the four occasions
in which the Supreme Court has addressed the First Amendment in
the context of student speech. The federal circuit courts have strug-
gled to define the limits of these precedents when presented with
speech that takes place outside of the physical territory of the school
grounds. As a result of this struggle, the circuit courts have developed
tests for deciding whether a school may regulate off-campus speech.
Part II explains the two most prominent standards—the reasonably
foreseeable test and the nexus test. Part II concludes by articulating
5. See Daniel Marcus-Toll, Tinker Gone Viral: Diverging Threshold Tests for Ana-
lyzing School Regulation of Off-Campus Digital Student Speech, 82 FORDHAM L.
REV. 3395, 3399 (2014).
6. Id. (“Indeed, school officials may prohibit many forms of student expression that
would otherwise generally be protected by the First Amendment.”).
7. See Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 266. But see Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (acknowledging the fact that students do not forfeit all
of their constitutional rights by virtue of being at school).
8. See Jon G. Crawford, When Student Off-Campus Cyberspeech Permeates the
Schoolhouse Gate: Are There Limits to Tinker’s Reach?, 45 URB. LAW. 235, 236
(2013) (“The absence of a definitive Supreme Court ruling clarifying the authority
of school leaders to impose disciplinary consequences for student off-campus in-
ternet speech that permeates the metaphorical gate is creating a vexing chal-
lenge for both school leaders and lower courts.”).
9. See, e.g., Marcus-Toll, supra note 5, at 3420–29.
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the Ninth Circuit’s approach to off-campus student speech and explor-
ing how this approach is applied in C.R. v. Eugene School District
4J.10
Part III addresses the initial question of whether the Supreme
Court’s student speech jurisprudence should apply to off-campus
speech in certain circumstances. This examination of the Court’s pre-
cedent will yield the conclusion that the circuit courts were correct in
authorizing regulation of off-campus speech; however, their applica-
tion of this regulation is flawed. The Ninth Circuit is correct that not
all off-campus speech is untouchable, but its practice of applying the
reasonably foreseeable test and nexus test is ineffective and led to the
wrong outcome in C.R. v. Eugene School District 4J.11 Part III ad-
dresses the shortcomings of the Ninth Circuit’s approach and proposes
a threshold test for determining when off-campus speech may be regu-
lated by school administrators. This test aims to address the weak-
nesses of other proposed standards and provide greater speech
protection for students than what is provided by the reasonably fore-
seeable and nexus tests.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Supreme Court’s Student Speech Jurisprudence
“[T]he constitutional rights of students in public schools are not
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other set-
tings.”12 This assertion is well-accepted in the legal community; how-
ever, the circumstances that give rise to this diminished standard of
constitutional protection remain the subject of significant debate.13
The Supreme Court has only addressed the application of the First
Amendment to student speech on four occasions.14 All four cases in-
volved speech that was deemed on-campus; thus, the Court has never
explicitly determined whether, and to what extent, its precedents gov-
ern off-campus student speech.15
The first examination of a school’s authority to restrict a student’s
right to free speech and expression came in Tinker v. Des Moines Inde-
10. 835 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2016).
11. Id.
12. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986).
13. See, e.g., Crawford, supra note 8 (acknowledging the uncertainty surrounding the
scope of the Supreme Court’s student speech precedents).
14. See, e.g., Marcus-Toll, supra note 5, at 3406–14 (discussing the holdings and facts
relating to the four Supreme Court student speech cases).
15. Mary R. Loung, C.R. Ex Rel. Rainville v. Eugene School District 4J: Slowly Ex-
panding a School’s Ability to Reach Off-Campus Speech, 47 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REV. 97, 98 (2017) (“However, the Supreme Court has yet to address how its
precedents apply to off-campus speech.”).
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pendent Community School District.16 The Court’s holding provided a
framework for determining whether limitation of student speech is ap-
propriate17 while recognizing students necessarily retain constitu-
tional protections at school: “It can hardly be argued that either
students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”18 When courts rule on
the constitutionality of a school’s regulation of student speech, they do
so with an eye to Tinker.19 This pivotal case articulated a discernable
standard for assessing whether administrators may police the speech
of students.20 At the same time, the case recognized students do not
forfeit all their constitutional protections merely by virtue of being at
school.21 Tinker’s decision and its scope are fundamental to under-
standing the complex issue of off-campus speech.
The petitioner students in Tinker were members of a group that
opposed the Vietnam War. In an effort to publicize their opposition to
the war, the students wore black armbands through the holiday sea-
son.22 Principals at the petitioners’ high school were made aware of
this plan and implemented a policy to address it.23 Students were
asked to remove these armbands and if they did not comply, they were
suspended until they returned without the armband.24 The petition-
ers were suspended as a result of this policy and brought suit against
school officials.25
When ruling on this case, the Supreme Court’s opinion recognized
the need to defer to school officials in order for schools to maintain
authority over their students.26 However, this interest must be recon-
ciled and balanced with students’ prerogative to exercise their rights
under the First Amendment.27 The Court attempted to strike that bal-
ance, holding “conduct by the student . . . [which] materially disrupts
classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of
16. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
17. But see Marcus-Toll, supra note 5 (explaining that Tinker applies to issues of
school speech unless one of the three categorical exceptions apply).
18. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
19. See, e.g., C.R. v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, 835 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2016); Bell v. Ita-
wamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015); S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s
Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 2012); Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty.
Sch., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011); Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir.
2011).
20. C.R., 835 F.3d at 1152 (citing Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062
(2013) (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508, 514)).
21. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.




26. Id. at 507.
27. Id. (“Our problem lies in the area where students in the exercise of First Amend-
ment rights collide with the rules of the school authorities.”).
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others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of speech.”28 The Court analyzed the students’ expression
under this standard and found insufficient facts to support a finding of
material disruption or a substantial invasion of the rights of others.29
Tinker’s test can be summarized as follows: schools may police stu-
dent speech if it is reasonably likely to cause a substantial disruption
of school activities or interfere with the rights of other students.30 The
bar for substantial disruption is high. Speech that simply makes the
audience uncomfortable will not be suppressed under this standard.31
Additionally, school officials must base their disciplinary action on
more than fear of a resulting disruption.32 While the disruption need
not actually take place, restriction on student speech will only be sus-
tained if the school officials were reasonable in their belief that the
disruption would occur.33
Following Tinker, the Court ruled on three subsequent student
speech cases, and these decisions introduced categorical rules provid-
ing school administrators with the authority to regulate student ex-
pression based on the content of their speech.34 In Bethel School
District No. 403 v. Fraser, the Court heard a case involving the disci-
pline of a student based on a speech he gave during a school assem-
bly.35 The speech involved graphic and explicitly sexual metaphors, as
well as obscene gestures, which resulted in the student’s suspension
from school.36 The Court examined the school’s imposed discipline to
determine whether the student’s First Amendment rights had been
28. Id. at 513.
29. Id. at 505 (finding the wearing of armbands to school by the petitioners to be
“entirely divorced from actually or potentially disruptive conduct”).
30. See Crawford, supra note 8, at 238–39 (clarifying that the Tinker holding estab-
lished two independent bases upon which school limitation of student speech can
be justified—the material disruption basis and the rights of others basis).
31. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509 (“[I]t must be able to show that its action was caused by
something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness
that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”).
32. Id. at 508 (“But, in our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of distur-
bance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression.”).
33. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 397 (5th Cir. 2015) (finding that the
Tinker test can be satisfied if “the record contains facts ‘which might reasonably
have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material inter-
ference with school activities.’”) (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514) (emphasizing a
school’s ability to discipline a student when a substantial disruption occurs as a
result of speech or when such a disruption could have been reasonably forecast);
see also C.R. v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, 835 F.3d 1142, 1152 (9th Cir. 2016) (af-
firming the interpretation of Tinker’s substantial disruption language to only re-
quire schools to forecast said disruption).
34. See, e.g., Loung, supra note 15 (listing the categories of speech articulated by the
Court which justify a school’s regulation of student speech); Marcus-Toll, supra
note 5, at 3409–14.
35. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
36. Id. at 677–78.
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violated and concluded no such violation had taken place.37 The envi-
ronment in which the speech was disseminated was crucial to the
Court’s analysis: “A high school assembly or classroom is no place for a
sexually explicit monologue directed towards an unsuspecting audi-
ence of teenage students.”38 The lewd and inappropriate nature of the
student’s speech rendered the discipline appropriate. In so holding,
the Court established a categorical rule permitting schools to impose
sanctions upon students for offensively lewd and indecent speech.39
The next categorical rule promulgated by the Court was the prod-
uct of the Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier decision, which ad-
dressed school-sponsored speech.40 The dispute in this case revolved
around a high school newspaper and the school’s censorship of its con-
tent.41 An examination of the school’s suppressions and censorship of
certain articles resulted in the Court holding the school’s actions per-
missible: “[W]e hold that educators do not offend the First Amend-
ment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of
student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as
their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical con-
cerns.”42 The Court reasoned that when a school lends its name to a
student publication, it has an interest in demanding certain standards
be met if it is to be published.43 Thus, the Kuhlmeier decision estab-
lished a categorical grant of authority for schools to regulate school-
sponsored speech.
The most recent Supreme Court decision addressing the issue of
student speech was rendered in Morse v. Frederick.44 Again, the
Court’s decision announced a categorical rule authorizing content-
based restriction of student speech.45 The controversy in Morse devel-
oped when a student displayed a banner advocating illegal drug use
37. Id. at 676.
38. Id. at 685.
39. Id. at 685–86 (“Accordingly, it was perfectly appropriate for the school to disasso-
ciate itself to make the point to the pupils that vulgar speech and lewd conduct is
wholly inconsistent with the ‘fundamental values’ of public school education.”).
40. 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Marcus-Toll, supra note 5, at 3412 (drawing attention to
Kuhlmeier establishing a new test for “school-sponsored expressive activities”).
41. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 260.
42. Id. at 273.
43. Id. at 271–72 (“A school must be able to set high standards for the student speech
that is disseminated under its auspices—standards that may be higher than
those demanded by some newspaper publishers or theatrical producers in the
‘real’ world—and may refuse to disseminate student speech that does not meet
those standards.”).
44. 551 U.S. 393 (2007); see also Marcus-Toll, supra note 5, at 3413 (noting that the
Morse decision is the most recent Supreme Court decision involving student
speech).
45. See, e.g., Watt Lesley Black Jr., Omnipresent Student Speech and the School-
house Gate: Interpreting Tinker in the Digital Age, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 531 (2015)
(“In . . . Morse v. Frederick, the Court carved out [an] exception[ ] that allow[s]
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during a school sponsored-event.46 While the speech at issue took
place across the street from the school, the Court rejected the stu-
dent’s argument that his banner could not be labeled school speech.47
The Court addressed several factors supporting its finding that his
banner was in fact school speech rendering him subject to the dimin-
ished protections of the First Amendment:
The event in question occurred during normal school hours and was sanc-
tioned by Morse as an approved social event at which the district’s student
conduct rules expressly applied. Teachers and administrators were among the
students and were charged with supervising them. Frederick stood among
other students across the street from the school and directed his banner to-
ward the school, making it plainly visible to most students. Under these cir-
cumstances, Frederick cannot claim he was not at school.48
Upon finding the banner amounted to student speech, the Court con-
cluded the school officials did not violate the First Amendment rights
of the student when they confiscated the banner advocating drug
use.49 In so holding, the Court produced a categorical rule authorizing
the regulation of student speech promoting illegal drug use.50
The three preceding Supreme Court cases are instances in which
the Court declined to apply Tinker to student speech, instead opting to
create categorical rules to apply to certain categories of speech. If stu-
dent speech does not fall within one of the three enumerated catego-
ries—lewd and indecent speech, school-sponsored speech, or speech
advocating the use of illegal drugs—Tinker is applied to determine
whether restriction of the speech is appropriate.51
While Tinker appears to delineate a clear model for school officials
to follow when confronted with student speech issues, the Court did
not articulate a clear limit for the application of this test.52 The opera-
tion of the test outside the strict confines of the school campus is am-
school administrators to discipline students for speech . . . that advocates the use
of illegal drugs.”).
46. Morse, 551 U.S. at 393.
47. Id. at 393–94. This finding is particularly relevant to the scope of the Supreme
Court’s student speech jurisprudence. This holding is addressed in greater detail
in Part III of this Note during its discussion of the Supreme Court’s intention
that its precedents extend beyond the physical territory of the school.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 397.
50. Id. (“[W]e hold that schools may take steps to safeguard those entrusted to their
care from speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug
use.”); see generally Marcus-Toll, supra note 5, at 3413 (describing the case’s hold-
ing as allowing school officials to police student speech that they regard as en-
couraging illegal drug use).
51. See Black, supra note 45; see also Marcus-Toll, supra note 5, at 3410–11 (empha-
sizing that the three most recent Supreme Court student speech decisions repre-
sented exceptions to the standard established by Tinker, permitting school
officials to restrict student speech purely based on the content of said speech).
52. See, e.g., Loung, supra note 15 (“[T]he Supreme Court has yet to address how its
precedents apply to off-campus speech.”).
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biguous. Legal scholars and federal appellate courts appear to
generally support Tinker’s application to certain off-campus speech.53
However, there is a general consensus that some additional threshold
test is necessary for school officials to satisfy in order to apply
Tinker.54 The federal appellate courts are currently struggling to de-
fine a threshold test outlining the limits of Tinker’s application.55
These efforts have produced several tests, utilized by different cir-
cuits, articulating various means for assessing the propriety of speech
restriction; yet, these tests provide no meaningful hurdle for school
officials seeking to restrict student speech originating off-campus.56
B. Circuits Struggle to Define the Limits of Tinker
As case law in this area continues to develop, two tests for analyz-
ing the reach of Tinker have emerged.57 One of these tests is referred
to as the reasonably foreseeable test. This standard has been articu-
lated and implemented by the Eighth Circuit58 and the Second Cir-
cuit.59 Another attempt to define the scope of Tinker yielded the nexus
test, which has been applied to off-campus speech issues by the Fourth
Circuit.60 These two threshold tests are the result of federal courts
recognizing the need to adapt to the evolution of school speech while
preserving students’ First Amendment protection.61
1. The Eighth Circuit’s Approach: Reasonable Foreseeability the
Speech Will Reach the School
The Eighth Circuit examined a school’s ability to regulate student
speech originating off-campus in S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit
53. See id. (noting the absence of Supreme Court direction necessitated the lower
federal courts to develop standards for assessing whether schools could regulate
off-campus speech); see also Marcus-Toll, supra note 5, at 3416 (explaining the
need to apply Tinker off-campus as deriving in part from the rise of the internet
and changes in technology).
54. See C.R. v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, 835 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2016); S.J.W. ex rel.
Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 2012); Kowalski v.
Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011); Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d
334 (2d Cir. 2011). But see Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 396 (5th
Cir. 2015) (recognizing Tinker applies off-campus but declining to adopt any of
the threshold tests from other circuits: “[B]ecause such determinations are heav-
ily influenced by the facts in each matter, we decline: to adopt any rigid standard
in this instance; or to adopt or reject approaches advocated by other circuits.”).
55. See, e.g., Marcus-Toll, supra note 5, at 3420–29.
56. See discussion infra section III.B.
57. See generally Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2013).
58. See Wilson, 696 F.3d at 771.
59. See Doninger, 642 F.3d 334.
60. See Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011).
61. See, e.g., Marcus-Toll, supra note 5, at 3400 (listing modern issues that have con-
tributed to the application of Tinker off-campus).
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R-7 School District.62 This case involved the creation of a website by
students that was, according to the student creators, intended to “dis-
cuss, satirize, and ‘vent’ about events” at school.63 However, the racist
and degrading content of the website was eventually brought to the
attention of school officials.64
The Eighth Circuit addressed whether Tinker may apply to off-
campus speech, holding it applicable when the student’s speech was
reasonably foreseeable65 to reach the school community and cause a
substantial disruption.66 This holding expressed a threshold inquiry
to be conducted when speech occurs off-campus: is the speech reasona-
bly foreseeable to reach campus? The Tinker analysis is only con-
ducted if this question is answered in the affirmative.67 With these
considerations in mind, the Eight Circuit applied the reasonably fore-
seeable test to the contested speech in Wilson.
When applying the reasonably foreseeable test to Wilson’s website,
the Eighth Circuit held the content could reasonably be expected to
make its way to the school and impact the learning environment.68
The creators of the website claimed they had only told a handful of
friends about the site, and they used a Dutch domain site so users in
the United States could not find the website with a Google search.69
However, the court noted the site was not password-protected.70 Addi-
tionally, the Eighth Circuit echoed the sentiment of the District Court
that the posts were directed at the school.71 Based on these findings,
the reasonably foreseeable test had been satisfied and application of
Tinker was appropriate.
62. See 696 F.3d at 771.
63. Id. at 773.
64. Id. (explaining that the subject matter of the site included racist posts as well as
sexually explicit comments, which mentioned female students by name).
65. In implementing the reasonably foreseeable standard, the Eighth Circuit relied
on a decision from the Second Circuit expressing a similar justification for regu-
lating off-campus speech that could be expected to reach campus. Id. at 777 (“[A]
student may be disciplined for expressive conduct, even conduct occurring off
school grounds, when this conduct ‘would foreseeably create a risk of substantial
disruption within the school environment,’ at least when it was similarly foresee-
able that the off-campus expression might also reach campus.” (quoting Doninger
v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2008) (emphasis added))).
66. Id. at 776–77. The “reasonably foreseeable” language from this holding repre-
sents the additional threshold test school officials must satisfy to reach the
speech and the subsequent “substantial disruption” language represents the ap-
plication of the Tinker test.
67. Id. at 778.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 773.
70. Id.
71. The Eighth Circuit did not articulate specific factors to support their finding that
the posts were directed at the school. Id. at 778.
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2. The Fourth Circuit’s Approach: The Nexus Test
When confronted with off-campus student speech, the Fourth Cir-
cuit developed a standard unique to those of its sister courts.72 The
determinative consideration for the Fourth Circuit was the nexus be-
tween the speech and the school’s pedagogical interests: “[W]here such
speech has a sufficient nexus with the school, the Constitution is not
written to hinder school administrators’ good faith efforts to address
the problem.”73 In Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools, the Fourth
Circuit developed this standard authorizing school officials to restrict
off-campus student speech in response to a student-created MySpace
page dedicated to ridiculing another student.74 Derogatory comments
and demeaning photographs directed at the classmate were posted to
the page.75 School administrators responded to this incident by sus-
pending the creator of the page, Kowalski, from school and placing her
on a social suspension.76
In analyzing the legality of the action taken by the school adminis-
trators, the court recognized the school’s legitimate interest in “main-
taining order in the school and protecting the well-being and
educational rights of its students.”77 The court identified facts sup-
porting a finding of a connection between the speech and the school’s
interest: Kowalski was aware the dialogue generated by the MySpace
page would take place among the students of the high school, the im-
pact of the speech would be felt at school, and the vast majority of the
page’s members were students.78 In light of these facts, the court held
a sufficient nexus existed between the speech and the school.79 Hav-
ing satisfied the nexus test, the speech was within the reach of school
officials.80 The Fourth Circuit determined the application of Tinker to
Kowalski’s off-campus speech was appropriate.81
72. See Marcus-Toll, supra note 5, at 3425 (“Unlike the Second Circuit’s reliance on
foreseeability or the Third Circuit’s emphasis on intent, the Fourth Circuit
grounded its inquiry in the school’s broad educational mission and duty to its
students.”). But see Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011)
(examining the foreseeability of the speech reaching campus as well as whether
there was a sufficient nexus).
73. Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 577 (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 567–68.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 569.
77. Id. at 571.
78. Id. at 573.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 573–74 (holding the nexus between the student’s speech and the high
school’s pedagogical interest was sufficiently strong to warrant restriction of the
speech).
81. Id.
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C. The Ninth Circuit Tackles Off-Campus Student Speech:
C.R. v. Eugene School District 4J
The approach of the Ninth Circuit in C.R. v. Eugene School District
4J was consistent with recent Ninth Circuit precedent in its extension
of Tinker to off-campus speech82 and application of both the reasona-
bly foreseeable test and the nexus test introduced by its sister cir-
cuits.83 While the Ninth Circuit discussed and applied these two tests
to the student speech, its discussion did not endorse or adopt one test
over the other.84
1. Facts
The dispute in C.R. v. Eugene School District 4J stemmed from an
off-campus incident involving the sexual harassment of two stu-
dents.85 C.R. and a group of boys made sexually suggestive comments
regarding oral sex to a younger male and female student.86 An in-
structional aide for the school district happened upon the group of stu-
dents while these events were unfolding and asked the two younger
students if they felt comfortable.87 The male student said yes, and the
female said no.88 The female proceeded to tell the aide what had tran-
spired.89 On the following Monday, the instructional aide called the
school and spoke with the vice principal about what had taken place.90
After an informal investigation, the school disciplined the boys in-
volved in the incident. C.R. received a two-day suspension.91
The speech at issue occurred approximately five minutes after
school had been let out for the day, a few hundred feet from the
school’s property line at a public park.92 It is important to note, this
park bordered the school’s athletic field, and members of the school
faculty referred to the park and the athletic fields collectively as “the
82. See 835 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2016) (applying Tinker to off-campus speech that took
place in person); Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir.
2013) (holding application of Tinker appropriate to a student’s MySpace
messages); LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 983–86 (9th Cir. 2001) (ex-
pelling a student based on the content of a poem he wrote off-campus and subse-
quently showed to a teacher).
83. C.R., 835 F.3d at 1149. But see LaVine, 257 F.3d at 990–92 (applying Tinker to
the off-campus speech given its “potential for substantial disruption”).
84. See C.R., 835 F.3d at 1150 (“We follow Wynar in applying both the nexus and
reasonable foreseeability tests to C.R.’s speech.”).
85. Id. at 1145.





91. Id. at 1146–47.
92. Id. at 1145.
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back field.”93 C.R. claimed the school had no authority to suspend him
given the incident took place off-campus and on public property.94
2. The Court’s Justification for Applying Tinker to C.R.’s Speech
In reviewing the school’s decision to suspend C.R., the Ninth Cir-
cuit considered the threshold question of whether the school had the
authority to discipline C.R. for said speech in the first place.95 The
court ultimately determined the speech fell within the scope of Tinker,
thus rendering it subject to potential restriction by the school.96 In
reaching this conclusion, the court relied on Wynar v. Douglas County
School District which upheld the expulsion of a student for sending
messages over MySpace threatening to commit a school shooting.97
The Wynar court identified both the reasonably foreseeable standard
from the Eighth Circuit as well as the nexus test from the Fourth Cir-
cuit; however, the court declined to endorse one test over the other,
instead opting to run the speech through both standards.98 The C.R.
court followed the model established in Wynar by applying both the
reasonably foreseeable and nexus tests to the contested speech.99
When applying the nexus test, the court emphasized all of the par-
ties involved were students.100 Additionally, while the location was
technically off school property, the incident occurred only a few hun-
dred feet from campus on property that was frequented by students as
they came to and from school.101 The property line between the school
and the public park was ambiguous, and the students may not have
93. Id. at 1146 (noting the ambiguity of the property line: “[T]here is no visible
boundary to indicate where school property ends and the park begins.”).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1148 (explaining the outcome of this case would involve a two-step inquiry:
first, whether the school could regulate the speech, and second, whether the disci-
pline imposed “complied with the First Amendment’s requirements”).
96. Id. at 1152 (holding the school district had the authority to discipline the off-
campus speech).
97. Id. at 1149 (listing the two tests identified by the Wynar court: the nexus test and
the reasonably foreseeable test); see also Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728
F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2013) (identifying threshold tests used by its sister circuits
but declining to endorse one test over the other).
98. Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1069; see also C.R., 835 F.3d at 1149 (“Wynar declined to
choose between these tests, holding that both were satisfied in the case of a
threatened school shooting.”).
99. C.R., 835 F.3d at 1150.
100. Id. (“[A]ll of the individuals involved were students, a fact that typically counsels
in favor of finding that a student’s speech was susceptible to school discipline.”).
101. Id. The mere fact that the speech occurred off-campus could not be used to bar
application of Tinker; on the contrary, the close physical proximity of the location
of the speech and the school grounds was used to justify a finding of a sufficient
nexus. See id.
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realized they were no longer on school property.102 Furthermore, the
students had been let out of school shortly before the incident.103 The
court theorized that had it not been for the students walking home
from school, the harassment would not have taken place.104
The court then analyzed C.R.’s speech under the reasonably fore-
seeable standard.105 Administrators had to recognize the possibility
that the harassment would persist in the school hallways, and the
targets of the harassment would be distracted from their studies as a
result.106 The court held the speech to be reasonably foreseeable to
reach campus:
Because the harassment in this case was so closely connected to campus—on
the students’ walk home, a few hundred feet from the school, immediately
after school let out—administrators could reasonably expect that the effects of
the speech would extend to the students’ in-school experience.107
The court held both the nexus test and the reasonably foreseeable test
permitted school officials to regulate C.R.’s off-campus speech.108 This
holding is of particular significance due to the face-to-face nature of
the speech. Application of Tinker off-campus is overwhelmingly con-
ducted in the context of student cyber-speech.109
The Supreme Court’s student speech jurisprudence has definitively
held students are not afforded the full protection of the First Amend-
ment. Tinker’s framework is applied to determine whether a school
may regulate or limit student expression. This doctrine is well-settled.
102. Id. at 1150–51 (“There is no visual marker (i.e., a fence or other boundary) to
indicate where school property ends and the city park begins . . . .”).
103. Id. at 1151.
104. Id. (“The school’s schedule thus brought the students together on the bike path.
Had all of the students not been released from school at the same time and
walked home along the same path, the older students would not have had the
same opportunity to sexually harass the younger students.”).
105. Id.
106. This reasonably foreseeable standard was conducted from the perspective of the
school administrators. The court reasoned school administrators could have fore-
seen the speech reaching the school and causing a distraction thereon. See id.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 1152 (“For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the School
District had the authority to discipline C.R. for his off-campus . . . speech.”). After
determining the reasonably foreseeable and nexus tests had been satisfied, the
court went on to apply the Tinker test to determine whether the discipline con-
formed to the Supreme Court’s precedent. Id. at 1152–53.
109. See, e.g., Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015) (applying
Tinker to the content of a rap posted on a student’s Facebook page); Wynar v.
Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2013) (applying Tinker to a stu-
dent’s MySpace messages referencing a school shooting); S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v.
Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 2012) (applying Tinker to
students’ blog posts on a website they created); Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch.,
652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011) (applying Tinker to content from a student’s MyS-
pace page); Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011) (applying Tinker to a
student’s post on her publicly accessible blog).
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What remains unclear is the reach of a school’s regulatory arm when
student expression does not occur within the confines of the school-
house. Federal appellate courts have struggled with this question, and
these struggles have yielded imperfect threshold tests that must be
satisfied prior to Tinker’s application. The Ninth Circuit’s approach,
like those of its sister circuits, is flawed.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Tinker Should Be Applied Off-Campus Under Certain
Circumstances
Application of the Tinker analysis need not be limited to the physi-
cal confines of school property. Under certain circumstances, the abil-
ity for schools to regulate otherwise protected student speech should
extend off-campus.110 The Court’s holding in Morse v. Frederick sup-
ports this assertion.111 In Morse, the speech at issue did not occur on
school grounds, yet the Court deemed the school’s discipline appropri-
ate.112 “[T]he Morse Court found its student-speech jurisprudence ap-
plicable because Frederick was standing among fellow students,
during normal school hours, at an event sanctioned and monitored by
school officials.”113 By conducting this analysis and examining these
circumstantial factors, the Court illustrated the complexity of the is-
sue—complexity that cannot be resolved through a mere geographical
inquiry. The context of the speech, not just its physical origin, was
significant. In permitting regulation of speech that occurred outside of
the schoolhouse, the Court provided conclusive evidence that it never
intended to sever the applicability of its precedents as soon as a stu-
dent took a step off school grounds.114
110. But see Susan S. Bendlin, Far from the Classroom, the Cafeteria, and the Playing
Field: Why Should the School’s Disciplinary Arm Reach Speech Made in a Stu-
dent’s Bedroom?, 48 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 195, 222 (2011) (“Speech that takes
place outside the school environment . . . should be beyond the school’s discipli-
nary reach, but if a disruption results on campus, that disruption itself can be
suppressed and those involved can properly be disciplined.”).
111. 551 U.S. 393, 400–01 (2007) (rejecting the student’s argument that his speech
was outside the purview of the school’s authority merely because he was not
physically on school grounds).
112. Id.
113. Marcus-Toll, supra note 5, at 3414.
114. Morse, 551 U.S. at 400–01. It is important to note that when the Court examined
the circumstances surrounding the speech, it concluded the student could not to-
tally claim the speech was off-campus. Id. It held the speech was on-campus and
subject to restriction. Id. This is an important distinction to note because the
Court was not explicitly stating its precedent is applicable off-campus. See id.
Notwithstanding its failure to expressly hold its precedents applied off-campus,
this holding is evidence of the Court’s unwillingness to bar school officials from
restricting all speech that takes place beyond the school’s property lines.
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The language in the Morse decision demonstrates the legality of
Tinker’s application off-campus under certain conditions. However,
this conclusion serves to further confuse the issue of student speech by
muddying the limits of a school’s regulatory authority. Morse is evi-
dence that the scope of Tinker is not easily defined.
B. Criticisms of the Ninth Circuit’s Approach to Off-Campus
Speech
The Ninth Circuit’s standard for assessing a school’s ability to reg-
ulate off-campus speech is flawed.115 A school’s interest in restricting
speech is necessarily more attenuated when the speech is off-cam-
pus.116 The goal and purpose of any threshold test is to provide
greater protection for students speaking off-campus as opposed to on-
campus.117 These tests are to serve as an additional obstacle for school
administrators because the speech is further removed from the class-
room.118 The Ninth Circuit’s approach fails to achieve this goal.
While the Ninth Circuit has not expressly adopted the reasonably
foreseeable or nexus tests,119 their recent precedent applies both tests
to contested speech.120 Both tests have their own unique shortcom-
ings. Essentially, the court fails to provide the necessary additional
protection for students speaking outside of school.121 Standing alone,
neither test furthers the purpose of providing an additional barrier to
school officials seeking to restrict speech.
115. See generally Loung, supra note 15 (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s approach to
off-campus speech in C.R.).
116. Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 573 (4th Cir. 2011) (“There is
surely a limit to the scope of a high school’s interest in the order, safety, and well-
being of its students when the speech at issue originates outside the schoolhouse
gate.”).
117. See, e.g., Marcus-Toll, supra note 5, at 3433 (“The courts’ perceived need for a
threshold test . . . indicates their continued rejection of plenary school regulatory
authority.”).
118. See Elizabeth A. Shaver, Denying Certiorari in Bell v. Itawamba County School
Board, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 1539, 1595 (2017) (“Some scholars . . . believe that a
‘two-tiered’ inquiry under which school officials must first determine the reasona-
ble foreseeability that a student’s speech would reach school is a ‘more conserva-
tive approach’ that provides greater protection to students’ First Amendment
rights, essentially because there is a threshold inquiry before Tinker’s substantial
disruption standard is applied.”).
119. Id. at 1569–70.
120. C.R. v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, 835 F.3d 1142, 1150 (9th Cir. 2016) (following its
Wynar precedent in applying both standards to the speech at issue).
121. See supra notes 117–18 and accompanying text.
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1. The Nexus Test Is Unclear and the Factors for Reviewing
Courts to Consider Have Not Been Adequately
Articulated
The greatest flaw of the nexus test is the lack of clarity and direc-
tion provided by the Fourth Circuit. The Kowalski court failed to flesh
out exactly what factors should be considered when determining
whether a sufficient nexus exists.122 The court concluded: “[W]e are
satisfied that the nexus of Kowalski’s speech to Musselman High
School’s pedagogical interests was sufficiently strong to justify the ac-
tion taken by school officials in carrying out their role as the trustees
of the student body’s well-being.”123 The basis for this conclusion and
the factors that guided the court in reaching this conclusion are not
entirely clear from the opinion.124
The lack of clarity from the Kowalski opinion poses significant
problems. By failing to delineate specific factors, the Ninth Circuit has
left reviewing courts and school officials without guidance or a frame-
work to reference when applying the standard.125 Going forward, the
proper way to implement the nexus test is something of a mystery.
Consequently, not only does this uncertainty have the potential to
yield inconsistent results, it could also lead to overly broad application
of the test,126 subjecting more students to speech restriction.127 An
overbroad application would defeat the purpose of these threshold
tests: to provide greater protection to students speaking off-campus.
2. The Reasonably Foreseeable Test Provides No Additional
Protection for Off-Campus Speech
As noted above, the purpose of a threshold test should be to revoke
a school’s ability to apply Tinker to off-campus speech under some cir-
cumstances. The school’s interest in controlling the school environ-
ment is necessarily more attenuated when the speech occurs off-
122. See Marcus-Toll, supra note 5, at 3431; see generally Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty.
Sch., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011).
123. Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 573.
124. Marcus-Toll, supra note 5, at 3431 (“Moreover, the Kowalski court left unresolved
the methodology for determining when or whether the nexus between off-campus
student speech and a school’s pedagogical interests is ‘sufficiently strong.’”); see
Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 573 (considering additionally the reasonable foreseeability
of the speech reaching school property, thus raising uncertainty as to whether the
court’s decision was based primarily on the nexus or the foreseeability factor).
125. See Bendlin, supra note 110, at 221 (“The problem with vague standards is that
neither school officials nor students know exactly what the rules are.”).
126. Marcus-Toll, supra note 5, at 3431.
127. See Shaver, supra note 118, at 1595 (“[S]uch a standard easily can be ‘stretched
too far’ and thus ‘risk[s] ensnaring any off-campus expression that happened to
discuss school-related matters.” (quoting J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain
Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 940 (3d Cir. 2011))).
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campus.128 In the context of this policy rationale, the Eighth Circuit’s
reasonably foreseeable standard is problematic because it is substan-
tively hollow, particularly when considering the Ninth Circuit’s appli-
cation. The Ninth Circuit conducts the reasonably foreseeable
analysis from the perspective of the school official, not the student.129
This approach does little to act as an additional barrier between ad-
ministrators and students.130 The standard simply extends Tinker to
off-campus speech without any qualification. In practice, application
of this test is not a sufficient restraint on school officials and
administrators.
When the reasonably foreseeable threshold analysis is conducted
from the perspective of school officials,131 the subsequent Tinker anal-
ysis adds little to the inquiry.132 Tinker provides authority to regulate
and restrict student speech if the speech could be reasonably forecast
to cause a substantial disruption in the classroom.133 The requisite
standard for forecasting such a disruption is a high bar.134 If an ad-
ministrator could reasonably forecast speech to cause a disruption, the
speech would almost certainly have been reasonably foreseeable to
reach the school.135 How could speech ever be anticipated to cause a
disruption at school if it could not be anticipated to reach the school in
the first place? Logically, school officials could not foresee a substan-
tial disruption if they could not anticipate the speech reaching school.
128. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969)
(“[T]he Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the comprehen-
sive authority of the States and of school officials . . . to prescribe and control
conduct in the schools.” (emphasis added)); Marcus-Toll, supra note 5, at 3399.
129. C.R. v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, 835 F.3d 1142, 1151 (9th Cir. 2016). The Ninth
Circuit assesses the foreseeability of the speech as it relates to the school officials.
Id. (“Administrators could also reasonably expect students to discuss the harass-
ment in school.” (emphasis added)).
130. See Shaver, supra note 118, at 1596 (“Because almost all electronic speech could
be deemed as ‘reasonably foreseeable’ to come to the attention of school officials,
the reasonable foreseeability standard seems to provide very little protection to
students.”).
131. See C.R., 835 F.3d at 1151.
132. Courts applying the reasonably foreseeable standard appear to merge the thresh-
old question with the Tinker analysis instead of addressing two independent
questions with two distinct levels of analysis. This approach can cause confusion
by muddying the distinction between the foreseeability of the speech reaching
school (threshold test) and the foreseeability of the speech causing a substantial
disruption or interfering with the rights of other students (Tinker test). See Don-
inger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 349 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[I]t was reasonably foreseeable
that Doninger’s post would reach school property and have disruptive conse-
quences there.”).
133. See, e.g., Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.
134. Id. at 508 (noting a school official’s mere fear of a resulting disruption is not
enough to warrant suppression of student expression).
135. See Shaver, supra note 118, at 1596 (discussing the unlikelihood that digital ex-
pression would ever survive the reasonable foreseeability examination).
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Accordingly, speech subject to Tinker would rarely be deemed pro-
tected by way of its off-campus origin through application of the rea-
sonably foreseeable standard. The Ninth Circuit’s application of the
reasonably foreseeable threshold test does not supplement the already
high Tinker reasonable forecast standard. In other words, the thresh-
old test would rarely withdraw a school’s ability to regulate speech
that takes place off-campus.136
The Ninth Circuit’s application of the reasonably foreseeable test
merely rephrases the language of the Tinker analysis. It is hard to
imagine a situation in which off-campus speech would be subject to
regulation under Tinker but fail the reasonably foreseeable threshold
test. The test is toothless in its ability to reign in school regulatory
authority and does not add any substantive speech protection to that
already existing under Tinker.137
3. Policy Implications from the C.R. Decision
Threshold tests found in federal appellate cases were developed in
response to cyber speech and the need to address a school’s ability to
regulate speech in the digital age.138 Alternatively, the Ninth Circuit’s
decision applied this framework in a context that was not originally
anticipated when the threshold tests were developed. The C.R. court
uses the test to justify restriction of student speech that took place
face-to-face.139 This decision is concerning, in part, because it repre-
sents an extension of power for school administrators.140
C.R.’s holding opened the door for administrators to discipline in-
person conversations between students off-campus, while failing to ar-
ticulate a limit: “[T]he Ninth Circuit declined to hold whether its deci-
sion of allowing schools to regulate off-campus public speech would
136. Id. (“By providing such a low threshold for the imposition of school discipline, the
reasonable foreseeability test unduly constricts students’ ability to engage in free
speech about an important and predominant aspect of their lives: school.”).
137. See Clay Calvert, Punishing Public School Students for Bashing Principals,
Teachers & Classmates in Cyberspace: The Speech Issue the Supreme Court Must
Now Resolve, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 210, 251 (2009) (“[A]n approach . . . that
relies solely on whether it is reasonably foreseeable that the speech in question
will come to the attention of school authorities gives schools sweeping off-campus
jurisdictional power.”).
138. See generally Black, supra note 45; James M. Patrick, The Civility-Police: The
Rising Need to Balance Students’ Rights to Off-Campus Internet Speech Against
the School’s Compelling Interests, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 855 (2010).
139. C.R. v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, 835 F.3d 1142, 1150 (9th Cir. 2016) (“We have not
yet considered whether a school may discipline a student for off-campus sexual
harassment. Nor are there any directly analogous decisions from any other cir-
cuit. Rather, the vast majority of the law in this area concerns school officials’
authority to discipline students for internet speech.”).
140. See Loung, supra note 15, at 107 (asserting the Ninth Circuit’s decision in C.R.
increased the “scope of a school’s ability to regulate off-campus speech”).
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extend to public places in general.”141 The C.R. decision appears to
expand the regulatory capacity of schools by creating an omnipresent
authority to loom over students. The implications of such perpetual
oversight should not be underestimated, and scholars have warned of
the potential adverse impact of such sweeping school authority: “Con-
sequently, this approach entails a considerable risk of chilling pro-
tected speech.”142 Regulating expression in this context represents a
more significant infringement on First Amendment rights than cases
restricting cyber speech. Accordingly, greater protection should be af-
forded to students communicating in this context. It is with these con-
cerns in mind that this Note strives to create a meaningful and
effective threshold.
C. Proposed Threshold Test: The Availment Standard
The availment test proposed by this Note addresses the shortcom-
ings of the existing circuit tests143 with an eye toward providing en-
hanced protection for off-campus speech. This test will direct
reviewing courts to conduct a two-step inquiry: (1) Was it reasonably
foreseeable, from the student’s perspective, that the speech would
reach the school? (2) Is the speech sufficiently related to the school? It
may be helpful to think of the availment test as a product of the con-
cepts of personal jurisdiction144 tailored to fit the context of student
speech. The foreseeability question parallels the purposeful availment
analysis in personal jurisdiction,145 and the relatedness prong serves
the same purpose in the school speech context as the personal jurisdic-
tion context.146 The foreseeability analysis differs from the Ninth Cir-
141. Id. at 105.
142. Marcus-Toll, supra note 5, at 3430. This comment was made in the context of
criticizing the Second Circuit’s reasonably foreseeable standard. Id. Marcus-Toll
is concerned with the Second Circuit’s failure to limit application of the test to
those circumstances involving off-campus digital speech. Id.
143. See supra section III.B.
144. See generally Kyle W. Brenton, BONGHiTS4JESUS.COM? Scrutinizing Public
School Authority Over Student Cyberspeech Through the Lens of Personal Juris-
diction, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1206 (2008) (discussing the role personal jurisdiction
factors can play in the analysis of whether off-campus speech may be regulated
by school officials).
145. Some scholars have framed the question of a school’s regulatory authority
through an examination of purposeful availment. See generally id. However, this
question is typically addressed in the context of cyberspeech and the particular
factors considered by scholars vary. Cf. id. at 1234–35 (discussing two potential
bases for purposeful availment: (1) students accessing off-campus websites while
at school; and (2) “off-campus cyberspeech that intentionally causes harm within
the school environment”).
146. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 109 (1987) (“Jurisdic-
tion is proper . . . where the contacts proximately result from actions by the de-
fendant himself that create a ‘substantial connection’ with the forum State.”
(quoting McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957))).
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cuit’s approach by conducting the assessment from the perspective of
the student speaker, as opposed to the school administrator. The sec-
ond step of the test, the relatedness prong, modifies the Fourth Cir-
cuit’s nexus considerations by delineating specific factors to be
weighed when assessing the content of the speech and its connection
to the school. Only after an affirmative finding of foreseeability and
relatedness is application of Tinker appropriate.
The first prong of this test asks whether it was reasonably foresee-
able, from the student’s perspective, that his or her speech would
reach the school. This analysis requires an objective rather than sub-
jective standard. Courts are to look to what a reasonable student
would anticipate, not what the individual student in each case antici-
pated. If a reasonable student knew or should have known his or her
speech would reach school, the foreseeability prong is satisfied.147
Again, it is important to acknowledge this test looks at foreseeability
from the eyes of the student rather than the administrator. While the
Ninth Circuit explicitly conducted the analysis from the perspective of
the administrator,148 other circuits using this standard are not clear
as to whether it is the student or administrator’s foreseeability at is-
sue.149 When the analysis is conducted from the perspective of the ad-
ministrator, the threshold test fails to act as a screening
mechanism150 and simply extends Tinker off campus in nearly every
conceivable circumstance.151
In addressing the question of foreseeability, the medium from
which the speech originates is the most important factor to be consid-
ered.152 Student speech taking place off campus and in person should
not be subject to the diminished First Amendment protection afforded
under Tinker. Speech that is not published, but takes place in person,
cannot be anticipated to reach the school to the same extent as pub-
147. This standard is distinct from the state of mind standard articulated by James
Patrick. See generally Patrick, supra note 138, at 888 (“An objective analysis
should ask whether . . . the student intended to guarantee his speech reached the
school. If the answer is yes, the speech is deemed on-campus speech subject to the
Supreme Court’s existing student speech jurisprudence.” (emphasis added)).
148. C.R. v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, 835 F.3d 1142, 1151 (9th Cir. 2016)
(“[A]dministrators could reasonably expect the harassment’s effects to spill over
into the school environment.” (emphasis added)).
149. See S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771 (8th Cir.
2012); Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011).
150. See Marcus-Toll, supra note 5, at 3430 (referring to the Second Circuit’s applica-
tion of the reasonably foreseeable test in Doninger: “[T]he Doninger test seems
overly broad. . . . [T]he Doninger test fails to create a meaningful threshold.”).
151. See discussion supra subsection III.B.2.
152. See Patrick, supra note 138, at 881 (“In order to determine a student’s intent,
another scholar has suggested looking at the type of technology used to communi-
cate the message.”).
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lished speech.153 Conversely, the permanent nature of published
cyber speech significantly undermines a student’s privacy expecta-
tions and makes it far more likely a reasonable student would antici-
pate the speech reaching the school. Publication creates a
presumption of foreseeability, but this presumption may be rebutted.
Reviewing courts should consider the manner of publication and the
size of the audience when assessing foreseeability. If the speech is
published but only made available to a single individual or small
group, a finding of foreseeability is less likely. However, if the speaker
targets a broader audience and the content of the speech is widely dis-
seminated, this will tend to negate his or her expectation of privacy
and cut toward a finding of foreseeability. After a finding of foresee-
ability, a court will consider the relatedness prong.154
This relatedness prong modifies the considerations articulated by
the Fourth Circuit.155 The Fourth Circuit’s analysis of the connection
between the pedagogical interest of the school and the speech need not
come into play. These considerations are more appropriately ad-
dressed during the substantial disruption and interference with the
rights of others analysis of Tinker;156—they need not be examined as
part of a threshold test. Instead, regulation of student speech will be
proper if the speech is sufficiently related to the school or school activi-
ties.157 Does the content of the speech involve other students, conduct
taking place during school hours, or conduct taking place during a
school event? These are important questions for a court analyzing the
relatedness of the speech and the school.
1. The Availment Test Is a Stronger Legal Standard than Other
Proposed Threshold Tests
The availment test prioritizes protecting student speech in a vari-
ety of contexts over concerns of judicial efficiency. As such, this pro-
posed standard will provide greater protection for students speaking
off-campus than other proposed threshold tests. By replacing the
153. Off-campus speech is considered private in a way on-campus speech is not; how-
ever, when this speech is published, these considerations change. See id. at 856
(“Although the student’s speech occurred in a private setting off campus, the in-
ternet speech is transferrable and could end up reaching the school.”).
154. However, restriction of the speech will be sustained absent a finding of foresee-
ability if the speech at issue threatens an act of violence at the school. See discus-
sion infra subsection III.C.2.iii.
155. See Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 573 (4th Cir. 2011) (explaining
the nexus between the speech and the school’s pedagogical interests).
156. See Crawford, supra note 8, at 238–39.
157. See Brenton, supra note 144, at 1234 (“A court analyzing a school’s claim of au-
thority over student cyberspeech should first determine whether or not that
speech has sufficient minimum contacts with the school environment.”).
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Ninth Circuit’s hollow standard of administrator foreseeability158
with a reasonable student standard, this test provides a hurdle for
school officials to overcome. The importance of publication for a find-
ing of foreseeability should render this hurdle nearly impossible to
surmount when the speech takes place face–to-face. Instead of the am-
biguous and unclear nexus standard159 posited by the Fourth Cir-
cuit,160 the availment test articulates factors for a court to consider
when determining whether the speech is related to the school or
school activities. Additionally, this test eliminates the redundancy of
the Fourth Circuit’s pedagogical interest inquiry, which is more ap-
propriately conducted during application of Tinker.161 This two-prong
test operates to provide greater protection for students speaking off-
campus while recognizing the need to restrict student speech in cer-
tain circumstances.162 The following hypothetical scenarios will
demonstrate the balance established by this test.
2. Applying the Availment Test
a. Cyber Bullying
One common source of off-campus speech litigation is cyber bully-
ing.163 This speech typically involves publication of speech sent either
directly to the bullied student or more broadly in a manner enabling
many students to view the speech.164 The permanent nature of speech
published online cuts towards a finding of foreseeability. However,
while publication is a critical consideration in the analysis, it is not
dispositive. The presumption of foreseeability can be rebutted through
an examination of the target audience. If a student sent disparaging
messages directly to one other student, this would weigh against a
finding of foreseeability. Reasonable students would be less likely to
anticipate this kind of communication coming to the attention of the
school. On the other hand, bullying that reaches a broader audience
intended to expose the victim to ridicule from a vast group, like the
158. See, e.g., C.R. v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, 835 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2016).
159. See discussion supra subsection III.B.1.
160. Kowalski, 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011).
161. See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
(permitting regulation of speech that causes a substantial disruption of school
activities).
162. The use of a multi-factor test is preferable to many of the one-size-fits-all thresh-
old tests. Analyzing multiple variables creates a more sophisticated analysis by
taking the context surrounding the speech into account. See Calvert, supra note
137, at 251 (noting the benefits of a threshold test that utilizes multiple factors
while acknowledging that no two student speech cases are identical).
163. See, e.g., Black, supra note 45, at 531 (“Students are using technology to threaten,
bully, and harass . . . .”).
164. See Crawford, supra note 8, at 235 (noting the internet is increasingly a primary
source of communication between students).
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Myspace posts at issue in Kowalski,165 would satisfy the foreseeability
prong. Reasonable students understand the more the speech is circu-
lated, the more likely it is to reach the school.
After a finding of foreseeability, the analysis turns toward the rela-
tion between the speech and school. This inquiry will hinge completely
on content. The fact that a student is the subject of the speech is not,
by itself, enough to satisfy the relatedness prong. If a student was bul-
lied based on an incident that took place at the local mall the previous
weekend, the speech would not be sufficiently related to the school.
However, when the speech involves the school, a school function, or an
incident relating to or taking place at school, a different outcome will
follow. For example, if a student was bullied for his performance in a
school play, the speech would satisfy the relatedness test.
In the context of cyber speech, the outcome under the availment
test will largely turn on the intended audience and the content of the
speech.
b. Political Speech
One of the most widely recognized norms of First Amendment ju-
risprudence is the substantial protection afforded to political
speech.166 This category of speech evinces the importance of a thresh-
old test to limit the reach of Tinker. Employment of the availment test
serves to prevent Tinker’s application in situations that would have
the effect of regulating and restricting political speech.
Imagine a student goes to a rally for a controversial political candi-
date who advocates for strict deportation policies. The student records
the rally and posts it on his Twitter page. As a result, many immi-
grant students become furious with his posting and are uncomfortable
around him. Under simple application of Tinker, this speech would
likely be subject to restriction because a school official could reasona-
bly forecast a substantial disruption as a result of the student’s post.
However, application of the availment test would withdraw the
school’s ability to restrict the speech pursuant to Tinker.
In this situation, the foreseeability prong of the test would be satis-
fied. Not only was the speech published, but it was directed toward
165. The student speaker in Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools created a group dis-
cussion page on Myspace and used the page to “orchestrate a targeted attack on a
classmate.” 652 F.3d 565, 567 (4th Cir. 2011).
166. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (“Discussion of public issues and debate on
the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of gov-
ernment established by our Constitution. The First Amendment affords the
broadest protection to such political expression . . . .”).
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many viewers via Twitter.167 However, the speech clearly fails the
second prong of the test as it is in no way related to the school, school
activity, or specific student conduct. The fact that a reasonable stu-
dent could have foreseen the content of the speech reaching the school
does not control the outcome. When there is a lack of relatedness be-
tween the speech and the school, restriction of speech is impermissible
notwithstanding the foreseeability of the speech reaching the school.
The availment test would prevent regulation of political speech, a cat-
egory of speech courts are loath to restrict.168
c. Threats of School Violence
Suppose a student writes a post via social media indicating his in-
tention to commit an act of violence at school. This information even-
tually makes its way to school administrators, and the student is
suspended. The fact that the speech was published yields a fairly
straight-forward outcome. The publication creates a presumption that
a reasonable student would anticipate this speech coming to the atten-
tion of the school. The content of the speech is clearly related to the
school. Threatening school violence or a school shooting is directly re-
lated to the school and school community because the violence is to
take place on school grounds, during the school day, and the victims
are to be students.  The relation between the speech and the school
could not be stronger.
The more difficult question is what the outcome should be if the
threat was conveyed from one student to another in a face-to-face in-
teraction. Generally, the availment test does not permit restriction of
speech that occurs off school property that was not published, but
threats of school violence warrant a narrow exception to the general
rule.169 Typically, a reasonable student would not have reason to be-
lieve their off-campus conversations would reach their school. How-
ever, when a student indicates a desire to harm others, it is
reasonable to expect this message will be relayed to the intended tar-
get of their violence. Reasonable students would recognize the foresee-
ability of such speech reaching school. The inquiry under the
relatedness prong is the exact same regardless of whether the speech
is published or communicated in person. In both instances, application
of Tinker would be appropriate.
167. See Marcus-Toll, supra note 5, at 3430–31 (pointing out the possibility that the
reasonably foreseeable test would not afford protection to a student’s political
speech).
168. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14.
169. See Dranoff, supra note 3, at 667–71, for a discussion of the need to protect stu-
dents from threats of school violence.
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d. Application to C.R.
If the Ninth Circuit had applied the availment test to the facts of
the C.R. case,170 the school would not have been able to regulate the
student speech. In fact, the speech at issue fails both substantive
prongs that make up this test’s framework.
Reasonable students in the speaker’s shoes could not foresee the
contested speech reaching school administrators. The speech took
place in person. As noted above, speech in this context is significantly
different than speech published online, which tends to be permanent.
It was only by chance the content of the speech reached school. Had
the school aide not happened to be passing the group of students dur-
ing the exchange,171 nothing suggests the speech would have ever
come to the attention of school officials. The student had no way of
knowing the aide would overhear his comments; therefore, a reasona-
ble student could not anticipate the speech making its way to the ear
of a school administrator.
An examination of the relation between the speech and the school
also supports the conclusion that the speech should not be subject to
restriction or discipline. The fact that the comments were made to a
fellow student is not enough to sustain a finding of relatedness. The
comments had no connection to the school, a school activity, or any
conduct taking place at the school.172 The lack of a relation to the
school renders the comments outside the authority of school officials
when said comments were made off-campus.
Application of the availment test renders the speech of the student
in C.R. beyond the regulatory grasp of school officials.173
3. Potential Criticisms of the Availment Test
This test may be subject to criticism in that its complexity could
prove difficult to apply for school administrators without legal educa-
tion.174 However, threshold tests are not actually being applied by
school administrators when they decide to suspend a student for off-
campus speech. In practice, school officials must act decisively when
handling matters of student discipline. It is only after the disciplinary
170. C.R. v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, 835 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2016).
171. Id. at 1146–47.
172. See id. at 1146.
173. There is no evidence that a reasonable student in C.R.’s position would anticipate
his speech being subject to school authority. Additionally, the content of the
speech fails the relatedness inquiry. See id.
174. Dranoff, supra note 3, at 664 (“It is extremely difficult for anyone without legal
training to apply, however, and thus provides little guidance for the untrained
students, parents, teachers, and administrators whom it would affect.”); see also
Brenton, supra note 144, at 1242 (“[T]his framework . . . does little to aid school
administrators or students in making ex ante decisions about real-world policy.”).
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decision has been made that the threshold test will be applied by
judges. Therefore, concerns about the complexity of the standard and
a school official’s capacity to apply it are misguided.
Another potential criticism is that in most circumstances, this test
will necessitate a fact intensive inquiry when determining whether
schools can reach the off-campus speech. Some jurists may prefer a
bright line framework to promote predictability and ease of applica-
tion. However, a one-size-fits-all approach to free speech issues has its
own dangers. Technology is ever changing, and legal scholars cannot
anticipate all circumstances surrounding future off-campus student
speech; therefore, a proposed threshold test must have a degree of
flexibility. Additionally, ease of application should not be a driving fac-
tor in determining the proper legal standard for the scope of Tinker.
The priority and purpose of a threshold test should be to stretch the
protections of the First Amendment to as many students as possi-
ble,175 not to promote judicial efficiency. The development of a sound
legal standard, which affords students as much protection under the
First Amendment as possible, should be prioritized above the simplic-
ity of the test’s application.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has recognized that student rights may be
curbed in a public-school setting.176 As a result, students are subject
to diminished First Amendment protection when they are speaking
on-campus.177 What is less clear is exactly when this weakened pro-
tection applies to student speech that takes place off-campus.178 This
lack of clarity prompted the development of threshold tests to deter-
mine whether school officials have the authority to restrict student
speech occurring off-campus.179 The purpose of such a test is to serve
as an additional obstacle for school administrators to overcome if re-
striction of student speech is to be sustained.180 The Ninth Circuit’s
application of the reasonably foreseeable test and the nexus test181
175. While it is well settled that schools have a unique and substantial interest in
protecting the school environment, this interest is not boundless. See supra note
114 and accompanying text.
176. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986) (“[T]he constitu-
tional rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with
the rights of adults in other settings.”).
177. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988).
178. See, e.g., Crawford, supra note 8, at 236.
179. See generally C.R. v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, 835 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2016); S.J.W.
ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 2012); Kowal-
ski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011); Doninger v. Niehoff, 642
F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011).
180. See supra section III.B.
181. C.R., 835 F.3d at 1150–52.
2018] C.R. V. EUGENE SCHOOL DISTRICT 4J 285
does not provide greater protection to students speaking off-campus as
opposed to on-campus and is thus an ineffective threshold test.
The availment test posited by this Note safeguards students’ First
Amendment rights to a greater extent than other threshold tests by
making it difficult for school administrators to apply Tinker off-cam-
pus. This end is achieved by incorporating the purposeful availment
concept of personal jurisdiction with pre-existing approaches to off-
campus speech.182 For speech to be within the scope of a school’s regu-
latory authority, this test requires an affirmative finding of purposeful
availment183 and a sufficient relationship between the content of the
speech and the school. Additionally, the test provides a restricting
mechanism that prohibits regulation of speech that would offend
traditional First Amendment norms.
While students are subject to a lessened First Amendment protec-
tion, this protection is not abrogated entirely.184 Replacing the reason-
ably foreseeable standard with purposeful availment and replacing
the nexus test with a relatedness inquiry more precisely achieves the
balance referred to in Tinker.185 When applied, the availment test
stretches the protections of the First Amendment to more students
than any other standard. While the test grants broad student speech
protection, it also provides courts with a framework for assuring
school officials may properly exercise control over the school
environment.
182. See discussion supra section III.C.
183. But see discussion supra subsection III.C.2.iii (acknowledging an exception to this
general rule when the speech at issue involves a threat of school violence).
184. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (“It can
hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights
to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”).
185. Id. at 507 (noting the need to reconcile a student’s ability to exercise his or her
First Amendment rights with the school’s interest in maintaining comprehensive
authority within the school environment).
